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MILITARY FORCES AND POLICE  
IN DYSFUNCTIONAL STATES 
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Armed forces and police in dysfunctional states of Sub-Saharan Africa are usu-
ally weak, both in terms of training, discipline, equipment and morale. The army 
is frequently dragged into political conflicts, especially as there is a rule that who 
controls armed forces has power, and the loss of control of the army is tanta-
mount to the loss of power. A similar problem concerns the police, which is even 
more corrupt and dependent on political influence. The police is often more 
preoccupied with supporting the ruling party than with protection of the public 
order, and citizens associate it with forcing various types of bribes. The analysis 
of the relation between the weak statehood challenges and the condition of the 
armed forces and police presented in the article is a result of the author’s long-
term research on dysfunctional states in Sub-Saharan Africa, based, inter alia, on 
the fieldwork conducted in more than twenty African states. 
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In dysfunctional states, armed forces are usually weak, both in terms of training, disci-
pline, equipment and morale. The army is frequently dragged into political conflicts, 
demoralised by participation in frequent coup d’état attempts or punitive expeditions 
against civilians opposing the government. There is a rule that who controls armed forces 
has power, and the loss of control of the army is tantamount to the loss of power. Military 
forces do not protect the country’s interest, and neither are able to defend its borders and 
population. The thesis of the article is that the army and the police forces in dysfunction-
al states in Sub-Saharan Africa are weak. In consequence, such states have trouble with 
maintaining their internal and external security. The research problem around which os-
cillates the analysis presented in the article is related to the question of security in dys-
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functional states. According to the author’s assumption, there is a correlation between the 
crisis of statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa and the chronic weakness of the military and 
police forces in states that experience such crises. These forces are only an external attri-
bute of statehood because in fact neither they can protect the state’s territory and borders 
nor provide security for its citizens. In consequence, non-state actors emerge on the state’s 
territory or penetrate it from the outside. The military is usually poorly trained and poor-
ly armed. In addition, the governing elites of many African countries appropriate the state 
apparatus in order to serve their individual interests. Permanent use of military forces for 
subsequent coup d’état attempts does not have positive influence on the morale. Conse-
quently, when a moment of a trial comes, which was the case during the Séléka rebellion 
in Central African Republic, the army is not able to effectively carry out military activi-
ties, and actually disintegrates. Frequently the army oppresses the civil population, and 
soldiers are perceived as not a lesser evil than rebels. In this case, however, the line is quite 
blurred due to the fact that as a result of frequent coup d’état attempts and civil wars rebel 
units become the government army after their leader takes power, and former soldiers of 
the losing government army organise rebel units.
What may exemplify such a situation it is the recent events in Central African Re-
public, where as a result of the 2012 civil war the power was seized by the Séléka. This 
group created military forces on the basis of its units. Such a situation has taken place in 
Sub-saharan African countries on numerous occasions. Former rank-and-file soldiers and 
officers have no other option but to join the armed opposition after the fall of the leader 
of the country in whose army they served, in particular, when they are from his ethnic 
group. Sometimes it is the only chance not only to earn a living, but also to stay alive. 
After overthrowing President Milton Obote in Uganda, Idi Amin liquidated about 2/3 
of the officer corps of the Ugandan army during the first year of his rule, suspecting it of 
loyalty towards his opponent; rank-and-file soldiers were also executed. The place of the 
executed soldiers in the army and officer corps was filled by Amin with people from his 
home region – Western Nile and Nubians.1
Another perfect example is also found in Central African Republic. The country’s 
armed forces (Forces Armées Centrafricaines – FACA) play the key role in taking and 
retaining power in the country. During the short history of CAR, the army has been 
frequently implicated in political conflicts, and has taken part in nearly all coup d’état 
attempts. The subsequent presidents Dacko, Bokassa, Kolingba, Bozizé and Djotodia 
came to power as a result of a coup d’état, supported either by the native army or by for-
eign mercenaries. Out of six presidents three used to be army chiefs of staff. The first 
president of Central African Republic, David Dacko, was overthrown by army chief of 
staff Jean-Bédel Bokassa. In 1979, he returned to CAR as a result of a coup d’état sup-
ported by French commandos sent by Paris as part of ‘Baracuda’ operation. In 1981, he 
was overthrown again by another army chief of staff – General André Kolingba. The 
only president who came to power through a democratic election (1993) was President 
1 M. Meredith, Historia współczesnej Afryki. Pół wieku niepodległości, transl. by S. Piłaszewicz, Warszawa 
2011, pp. 215-216.
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Ange-Félix Patassé, who quickly became very unpopular among military men. In the 
years 1996-1997, badly paid soldiers incited a number of rebellions in the country, and 
in 2001 an unsuccessful coup d’état attempt took place. Unable to rely on loyalty of the 
native army, Patassé requested Libya and Democratic Republic of Congo for help. Ac-
cusing the army chief of staff of ambiguous behaviour during the rebellion, in 2002 he 
tried to arrest General Bozizé. After fierce fighting, Bozizé with a group of 300 loyal sol-
diers fought its way to Chad, in order to return to CAR after a few months in charge of 
Chadian mercenaries and units of rebels recruited mainly from the northern part of the 
country.2 Some units from the CAR army, which were dissatisfied with the rule of the 
incumbent president, went to the Bozizé side very fast. In that situation, Patassé asked 
the Congolese and Libyans for help again, and the country plunged into a civil war, dur-
ing which units of foreign mercenaries wreaked havoc, looting, raping and murdering.3 
The situation repeated in 2012, when President Bozizé was overthrown by the Séléka, 
which was headed by Michel Djotodia. The Séléka units mainly consisted of Chadian 
and Sudanese mercenaries.
The use of ethnically alien troops in internal fighting is a frequent element of the real-
ity in African countries, used both by contenders who want to seize power, and incum-
bent leaders of the countries, who try to retain it. Apart from the above-mentioned Cen-
tral African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, the most famous examples 
include Uganda under president Idi Amin, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad and Mali.
When the Séléka rebels took power in the capital, and after a  few days seized the 
country’s whole territory, they became the actual CAR army, which resulted in dramatic 
consequences for the population. Missionary priest Mirosław Gucwa from the town of 
Bouar describes the ‘new army’ in the following way: Many of them come from the neigh-
bouring countries, mainly from Chad and Sudan. They mainly use Arabic and in vast ma-
jority don’t know French or Sango. While taking power, there were over 5 thousand of them, 
and currently their number increased as much as five fold. After a few days of training, new 
recruits receive arms, uniforms and are conscripted into the Central African army. Not hav-
ing much idea about military discipline and soldier’s honour, they commit numerous abuses, 
such as theft, rapes, extortion of fees at road barriers, shops, markets and many other places. 
Such abuse is perpetrated with explicit or implied consent of the officers in charge, whose mo-
rale also leaves a lot to be desired. In fact, even the military ranks they assign to themselves 
have been earned ‘for services’ in rebel campaigns in various African countries, and not after 
a long period of service and training.4
Currently, the military forces of Central African Republic are still weak and depend 
on external help. The country’s army consists of 4.5 thousand soldiers armed mainly with 
light weapons and basic equipment (in 2016 the CAR army had at its disposal only four 
2 Each mercenary was promised about FCFA 7 million (approx. EUR 10 thousand) reward if General 
Bozizé succeeds in seizing power. R. Wieczorek, Pęknięte serce Afryki, Kraków 2008, pp. 250-251.
3 The account of missionary priest Mirosław Gucwa, Bouar, Central African Republic, 15 August 2010.
4 Based on the account of missionary priest Mirosław Gucwa, Bouar, Central African Republic, 27 No-
vember 2013.
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obsolete tanks).5 The CAR military forces have been actively supported by France, which 
provides army instructors, and keeps an 800-soldier strong garrison in the capital.6 
During the last phase of President Mobutu rule in Democratic Republic of Congo 
(formerly Zaire) unpaid soldiers were, in fact, encouraged by superiors to loot and sack. 
In other words, regular troops ceased to be a well-disciplined formation which operates 
within the limits of the law and serves the state, and it would be difficult to distinguish 
them from private paramilitary groups. The situation aggravated even further when they 
became fragmented, frequently as a result of an intentional policy. In such a situation, 
apart from regular troops, units of e.g. president’s personal guard or other units which are 
allowed to operate unrestricted by the applicable law are created. At the end of the Mobu-
tu rule, the only unit he could actually rely on was his personal guard.7 Currently, what 
exemplifies such a unit is, for example, the guard of President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda 
(one thousand soldiers), headed by the president’s son, Brigadier-General Kainerugaba 
Muhoozi, trained at the prestigious Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst.8
What is equally dangerous is an army suddenly deprived of its leader. The same was 
the case after the death of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who was shot at the presiden-
tial palace in Kinshasa by one of his bodyguards. The chaos which engulfed the capital 
after the assassination led to anarchy in the streets. The worst were soldiers who looked 
for culprits in the streets of Kinshasa, and, at the same time, looted everything they could. 
Most commanders and officers connected with Kabila did not come from the province in 
which Kinshasa is located, but from Katanga, where the president came from. They were 
not even able to communicate in the language of the local population. Those soldiers, 
being far from their homes in a situation in which their leader had been murdered, were 
scared, nervous and very aggressive.9
According to a  UN report, the authorities of South Sudan allow the militia units 
which fight on their side to rape women. It is a form of ‘compensation’, since the govern-
ment is not able to pay them. The scale is so huge that according to the report in the pe-
riod from April to September 2015 as many as 1,300 such cases were reported.10
Even the armies of the regional military superpowers, such as Nigeria, prove to be in-
efficient in a dysfunctional state when they are put to the test. The activity of the armed 
terrorist group Boko Haram in that country is a telling example of that problem. This 
organisation conducts terror attacks, organises executions and with impunity kidnaps 
5 “2016 Central African Republic Military Strenght”, Global Firepower, at <http://www.globalfirepower.
com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=central-african-republic>, 14 December 2016.
6 J. Bender, “France’s Military Is All Over Africa”, Business Insider, 22 January 2015, at <http://www.
businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1>, 22 January 2015.
7 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford 2007, p. 98.
8 E. Ojulu, “The General in His Labyrinth”, New African, no. 558 (February 2016), p. 43.
9 T. Butcher, Rzeka krwi. Podróż do pękniętego serca Afryki, transl. by J. Czernik, Warszawa 2009, p. 28.
10 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “South Sudan: UN Report Con-
tains ‘Searing’ Account of Killings, Rapes and Destruction”, 11 March 2016, at <http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17207&LangID=E>, 5 September 2016. 
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young women from public institutions, such as schools, and it happens in a  country 
which has one of the strongest armies in Africa.11
In Zimbabwe, the military forces are fully controlled by the president and his par-
ty, ZANU-PF, and the selection of army members is conducted by means of the party 
key. As early as during the Rhodesia period, the forces of the black population which 
fought for the independence consisted mainly of representatives of the two biggest eth-
nic groups: Shona and Ndebele. Each of them had its political party and military forces. 
The Shona people were represented by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 
 whereas the Ndebele people by Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). After re-
gaining independence and creation of Zimbabwe in 1980, both guerrilla armies were 
merged into one national army with the former Rhodesian army. However, each of the 
former guerrilla armies kept its hidden stash of weapons, and since the very beginning 
there was no trust between both the politicians and soldiers of both tribes. Over two 
years ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, significantly strengthened its position in the power 
structures, and with the help of North Korean military advisers created the 5th Brigade, 
which was independent of the remaining army units. Only representatives of the Sho-
na people participated in the process of creation of that unit. The brigade was perfectly 
equipped and used different weapons and equipment than the rest of the army. Its com-
mand structure was organised in such a way that it was controlled only by Mugabe and 
the generals he trusted. In 1982, top-ranking officers of ZAPU, including the deputy 
commander of the national army, were arrested on the charges of treason and alleged 
planning of a coup d’état. Then, it was turn for lower-ranking officers and soldiers who 
were liquidated, arrested or thrown out of the army. Finally, the 5th Brigade rolled into ac-
tion, and its task was to pacify the Ndebele population, which inhabited the south of the 
country. The military operation led to the death of approximately 20,000 people, and as 
a result of it Mugabe and ZANU-PF took all power in Zimbabwe. Once Mugabe took 
power, the military forces were continuously used to pacify his political opponents. The 
situation which most clearly exemplified army’s dependence on ZANU-PF and Robert 
Mugabe took place during the 2002 presidential election. At that time, the generals an-
nounced that the army would not recognise as the president a person who would not be 
accepted by the army. Furthermore, top-ranking officers officially supported Mugabe, 
and soldiers were used to threaten the opposition.12 Currently, Zimbabwe’s army has 30 
thousand active soldiers and 20 thousand reservists, and according to Global Firepower 
is the 8th strongest army in Sub-Saharan  Africa. It is an obedient policy tool in the hands 
of President Mugabe and his political party.13 
11 “2014 Nigeria Military Strength”, Global Firepower, at <http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-
military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Nigeria>, 11 January 2015.
12 K. Chołaszczyński, Etnopolityka jako funkcjonalny element kształtujący system polityczny Republiki Zim-
babwe, Toruń 2014, p. 464.
13 I. Smith, Bitter Harvest. The Great Betrayal, London 2001, p. 371; A. Norman, Mugabe. Teacher, Re-
volutionary, Tyrant, Stroud 2008, pp. 76-80; “2016 Zimbabwe Military Strenght”, Global Firepower, 
at <https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=zimbabwe>, 
23 August 2016.
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A similar problem as the one described about the military forces in the dysfunctional 
states of sub-Saharan Africa concerns the police, which is even more corrupt and depen-
dent on political influence. The police is often more preoccupied with supporting the 
ruling party than with protection of the public order, and citizens associate it with forc-
ing various types of bribes. During his research, the author on numerous occasions was 
asked for a bribe by the police or customs services. Those situations took place in Central 
African Republic, Cameroon, Mozambique and Senegal. The police is often also organ-
isationally inefficient and poorly-equipped, which is why it is the army that is entrusted 
with protection of important events. There is no need to use examples of the most dys-
functional states to show weakness of police units, as it is sufficient to give the example 
of a country which is considered to be quite stable for African conditions, i.e. South Af-
rica, where the police is not able to deal with organised crime or prevent frequent attacks 
against white farmers.
It should be pointed out that in dysfunctional, post-conflict states both the army, and 
the police are a patchwork of various units which used to fight as rebel forces against the 
government or against other armed groups. Usually as a result of the agreement which 
ends a civil war these units in the so-called reconciliation process and building the peace 
process are included in the law and order apparatus, as well as are given a possibility of ful-
filling public service in the country. However, the practice shows that it is difficult to turn 
a rebel into a good policeman. There is no way out of this situation, as no rebel unit will 
agree to be completely disarmed and rely only on the agreement signed on paper, under 
which its fighters would be at the opponent’s mercy. Inclusion of the armed forces of the 
opposing parties in one military and police structure is a safeguard in the case in which 
obligations are not fulfilled, so the awareness of such a situation also has a huge influence 
on the morale of the military and police forces. Such situations took place in South Af-
rica, after the fall of the apartheid, in Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Namibia, 
Angola and Mozambique.14
It is a standard that in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, in particular during peri-
ods of tension and unrest, an important role is played by informal armed groups organised 
by tribal leaders or even by groups of mercenaries brought from abroad. Recently, such 
a situation has taken place in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ivory Coast, Sudan or Mali. During the 2001 civil war in Central African Republic, Presi-
dent Patassé used mercenaries from Chad and Democratic Republic of Congo. President 
Bozizé also used Chadian mercenaries who formed his personal guard. During the 1999 
civil war in Ivory Coast, both parties to the conflict used help of mercenary units from 
Liberia, whereas during the civil war in Mali Tuaregs were supported mainly by mercenar-
ies who used to be former soldiers of Muammar Gaddafi pushed out of Libya. A standard 
example showing how the line between military men and civilians is blurred was the civil 
14 E. Van der Spuy, “Transforming Safety and Security in Southern Africa: Some Trends and More Chal-
lenges”, in G. Cawthra (ed.), African Security Governance. Emerging Issues, Johannesburg 2011, pp. 47- 
-48, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.18356/8534c619-en>.
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war in the 1990s in Sierra Leone. In that conflict, classified as a so-called new war, the dis-
tinction between armies and armed groups practically ceased to exist.15
What may exemplify the use of armed groups by the government to fight a rebellion 
are Janjaweed units in Sudan. Both the victims of the repression and international moni-
tors emphasise that during the war in Darfur those units were not chaotic bands, but 
rather well-armed groups formed and supported in terms of resources and logistics by 
the government in Khartoum. Activists from international organisations, such as Human 
Rights Watch, indicated that the Sudanese army openly recruited mercenaries, promis-
ing them a rifle and monthly salary in the amount of USD 100 in exchange for joining 
the Janjaweed units. International Crisis Group claims that the central government’s con-
sent for looting of villages by Arab militias additionally motivated them to treat the civil-
ian population in a particularly brutal way. The Janjaweed raids were preceded with air 
strikes conducted by the Sudanese Air Force against villages which were recognised as 
hostile, and the unit commanders were quartered in the garrisons of the Sudanese army 
located in the biggest cities.16 The government in Khartoum officially denied those accu-
sations, suggesting that those groups formed as a response to attacks by non-Arab popula-
tion of Darfur. In an interview for the British newspaper The Guardian, one of the Janja-
weed leaders, Musa Hilal, said: The rebels disseminated the word ‘Janjaweed’ as if it meant 
some organisation. The term ‘Janjaweed’ doesn’t exist as some specific political group […] it 
doesn’t mean anything, and is used to describe everything.17 He also decisively denied that 
he took part in ethnic cleansing, admitting that he only responded to the government’s 
call to fight the rebellion in Darfur. The government presented a programme of arming all 
people. I summoned my sons, and told them to become soldiers.18 In fact the Janjaweed were 
a part of the so-called Popular Defence Forces (PDF) – paramilitary forces created by the 
Sudanese government to act on behalf of the security authorities. It means that thanks to 
establishment of PDF the Sudanese state handed over part of the monopoly for the use of 
force, and, consequently, the paramilitary units became the government’s tool for using 
repressive measures against some citizens.19
The 50-year-old history of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa is full of examples 
of rulers using mercenaries’ services. It usually took place in weak states with a high de-
gree of dysfunctionality, torn with internal conflicts, and whose leaders, fighting with 
the rebellion, were no longer able to rely on their own army, or when they were not 
sure of their presidential guard. In fact, not only governments, but also secessionists 
hired mercenaries, as was the case with Katanga in Belgian Congo or Biafra in Nigeria. 
Mercenaries became popular by a book written by Frederic Forsyth The Dogs of War, 
15 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars…, p. 186.
16 B. Koerner, “Who Are the Janjaweed? A Guide to the Sudanese Militiamen”, Slate Magazine, 19 July 
2005, at <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2004/07/who_are_the_
janjaweed.html>, 15 September 2012.
17 A. Taban, “Sudan’s Shadowy Arab Militia”, BBC News, 10 April 2004, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/3613953.stm>, 10 November 2013.
18 Ibid.
19 A. van Ardenne et al., Explaining Darfur. Lectures on the Ongoing Genocide, Amsterdam 2011, p. 33.
106 POLITEJA 5(50)/2017Robert Kłosowicz
and then a film made on its basis, which is set in sub-Saharan Africa.20 The most well-
known companies which offer military services (officially, security firms) include Kel-
logg, Brown & Root, Defence Systems Limited and, not operating any longer, Sand-
line International and Executive Outcomes. Apart from perfectly trained and equipped 
commandos, being usually former soldiers of special units, these companies offer their 
clients also state-of-the-art military technologies, including planes and helicopters. 
Services of these companies were used by the USA and European countries to protect 
their diplomatic posts in failed states, whose governments were not able to ensure secu-
rity of diplomatic representatives. For example, Defence Systems Limited protected the 
embassies of the USA, UK, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy and South Africa in Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Angola.21 To a significant extent their services are also used by 
big international corporations, e.g. Amoco, British Petroleum, Chevron, De Beers or 
Exxon. The most famous operation connected with participation of contract security 
firms in sub-Saharan Africa is the operation of Sandline International and Executive 
Outcomes during the civil war in Sierra Leone and Angola, when their units protected 
diamond mines (1997-1998).22 Also the Nigerian state, which is unable to effectively 
protect the installations of oil corporations in the Niger Delta, is supported by Shell, 
Exxon, Chevron, Total, Elf or Agip. Thanks to their financial support, a special police 
force has been established – Rivers State Internal Security Task Force, whose task is to 
protect oil infrastructure against armed units’ attacks. Furthermore, international cor-
porations help purchase military equipment and finance training for the Nigerian army 
stationed in the Niger Delta.23 
As it has already been mentioned on numerous occasions, the end of the Civil War 
had significant consequences for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, which depending 
on the side on which they were before the Cold War were protected by western states, 
mainly the USA, former colonial powers or the USSR. Provided with money, arms and 
instructors by their patrons, they were able to hide the security deficit for the duration of 
that conflict. Once it came to an end, the regimes left on their own started to crumble, 
and the local armed forces proved to be so inefficient that they were not able to protect 
the state against the internal rebellion. What deteriorated the situation further were eco-
nomic and social problems. The dramatic increase in the number of conflicts in the re-
gion of sub-Saharan Africa was its external manifestation. Thus, the space appeared for 
the security services provided by private companies, which are, in fact, corporations of 
mercenaries. On one hand, those companies have perfectly trained soldiers, mainly for-
mer members of elite units, and, on the other hand, their business is run by people con-
nected with the world of finance, who e.g. run businesses connected with the diamond 
20 Dogs of Wars, dir. J. Irvin, Juniper Films, USA/United Kingdom 1980.
21 Angola: Peace Monitor, vol. 4, no. 5 (31 January 1998), at <https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_
Action/apic_13198.html>, 30 October 2016.
22 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars…, pp. 100-101.
23 J.G. Frynas, Oil in Nigeria. Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities, 
Münster 2000, p. 54; W. Tycholiz, “Kryzys w Delcie Nigru”, in D. Kopiński, A. Polus (eds.), Zgubne 
transakcje. Fatal transactions. Surowce mineralne a rozwój państw afrykańskich, Warszawa 2010, p. 198.
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or arms trade. Thus, the security firms somehow represent on the ground their own in-
terests, in particular in countries rich with natural resources. The use of military compa-
nies by the governments of weak African states has the other side to it. Hiring foreign 
entities which provide military services, people in power, who do not hold in regard the 
skills of their own soldiers, give them to understand how little trust the government has 
for their skills and loyalty. (It is assumed that since the beginning of the 1990s, the mili-
tary firms have protected over one hundred presidents and prime ministers of African 
states). Thus, the distrust between the two parties grows, and foreign mercenaries, who 
are frequently better paid, are like a  slap in the face of the local military men. Private 
companies also recruit local soldiers, choosing the best ones and paying them a few times 
more than the government. It happens, as was the case in Sierra Leone, that soldiers left 
the army to get employed at a contract company which at that time provided services 
to their government. Worse still, those companies often employ people from one ethnic 
group, which, for example makes communication in a given language easier, but leads to 
tensions with the local army, as was the case in Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, 
when a given company leaves the country after performing the contract, its former local 
employees often form irregular units which act independently, and become well-trained 
robbers. What is worth presenting is the example of Equatorial Guinea, where in March 
2004 a failed coup d’état took place, which was organised by former employees of Execu-
tive Outcomes. The aim of the putsch was to overthrow dictator Obiang Nguema, and 
replace him with Severo Moto, who was in exile in Spain. At that time, the incumbent 
president was protected by security firm MPRI. Obviously, in the background there were 
the interests of rival oil companies.24 
The above-mentioned Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) since the be-
ginning of the 21st century focused its operation mainly on Africa. Its first contracts on 
this continent were in 2000 for the governments of Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Ni-
geria, as part of which the company created defence plans, organised coast protection 
and trained units to protect government buildings. As part of the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), it trained the armies of Benin, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Senegal.25
At the end of the 1990s, the above-mentioned South African contractor firm Ex-
ecutive Outcomes (EO) was the real heavyweight in the area of military services in Af-
rica. As early as after its first operations in Namibia and Angola, it became clear that 
soldiers from government units of African states stood no chance in a direct confron-
tation with well-trained and equipped with state-of-the-art military gear commandos 
of that company. That reputation was confirmed by further EO operations in Mozam-
bique, Malawi and Zambia.26
Interestingly, some African leaders are connected with military contract companies 
24 R. Uesseler, Wojna jako usługa. Jak prywatne firmy wojskowe niszczą demokrację, transl. by M. Kalata, 
Warszawa 2008, pp. 206-212.
25 Ibid., p. 96.
26 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
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as they have a stake in them, e.g. the former president of Kenya – Daniel Arap Moi and 
his family held shares of Ibis Air (Strategic Resources Corporation – SRC), in Uganda 
the president’s stepbrother, General Salim Saleh held a 45% stake in Saracen Uganda 
(arms trade).27
Table 1. Dysfunctional states and the strongest armies in the region. The countries of North 
Africa have been bolded
Country Global Firepower 2016 (Africa)
Global Firepower 
2016 (world)
Fragile States 
Index 2016
Global Peace 
Index 2016
Egypt 1 12 38 142
Algeria 2 26 76 108
Ethiopia 3 42 24 119
Nigeria 4 44 13 149
South Africa 5 46 108 126
Angola 6 54 37 98
Morocco 7 56 89 91
Sudan 8 71 4 155
Libya 9 72 25 154
Democratic Republic 
of Congo 10 73 8 152
Kenya 11 75 20 131
Tunisia 12 76 88 64
Zimbabwe 13 82 16 127
Zambia 14 85 49 40
Chad 15 89 7 136
Uganda 16 92 23 101
Tanzania 17 96 62 58
South Sudan 18 99 2 162
Ghana 19 100 102 44
Source: own compilation the basis of Global Firepower Index 2016,28 Fragile States Index 2016, Global 
Peace Index 2016.29
27 Ibid., p. 107.
28 “2016 African Powers Ranked by Military Strength Ranking”, Global Firepower, at <http://www.
globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-africa.asp>, 27 February 2017.
29 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2016, at <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/
page/indexes/global-peace-index>, 27 February 2017. 
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Finally, it is worth providing the data on the relationship between the countries’ 
estimated military strength vs. their internal weakness. As the table above shows, ac-
cording to the Global Firepower 2016, out of the 19 African states which are among 
the 100 countries with the strongest army in the world, 14 are from sub-Saharan Af-
rica, but as many as 12 of them are among the most dysfunctional states of the world 
in FSI rankings, and as many as 6 of them are in the ‘very high alert’ and ‘high alert’ 
group: South Sudan, Republic of Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nige-
ria, Zimbabwe).30 Consequently, in the reality of the states of sub-Saharan Africa the 
state’s military force does not guarantee its stability. Furthermore, in the Global Peace 
Index the countries which are considered to be strong in military terms in the region are 
at the bottom of the ranking of stable countries.31
To conclude, the military and police forces in dysfunctional states of sub-Saharan 
Africa reflect the condition of those states. All problems they face, such as poverty, cor-
ruption, lack of competence, ineffectual organisation, and tribalism are reflected in the 
condition of the military and police forces. An insufficiently armed and trained army 
is neither trusted by the political elite nor by society. Also its influence on the state 
through participation of high-ranking army officers in the political life (it is reflected, 
for example, in the number of African leaders with a long-standing career in the army), 
as well participation of military forces in numerous coup d’état attempts which have 
swept through African states does not raise the morale of those services, or increase 
trust in them. It has to be pointed out, however, that even the African states which 
have large armies (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya) are not able to deliver adequately on their 
potential in crisis situations or when fighting rebels. Military forces are also used in in-
ternal fighting during which human rights are repeatedly violated, and crimes against 
civilians are perpetrated (Sudan, Chad). 
It needs to be pointed out, however, that over the last years the situation has not im-
proved. This lack of improvement is, to a significant extent, connected with the fight 
with international terrorism, which more and more often also affects the states of sub-
Saharan Africa. The response to that threat is a wide-ranging military assistance pro-
gramme for African states, conducted mainly by the USA and European Union states, 
but the coming years will show whether this trend will continue.
30 Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2016, at <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/>, 27 February 2017.
31 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index 2016.
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